Deceived by Hamas, Israel caught In dilemma: The Economist Defense Editor

New Delhi: In the context of a nation's history, 50 years is relatively a short span. It’s a period of living history for a nation as young as Israel which came into existence just 75 years ago. Yet, the brutal attack carried out by Hamas on October 7 suggests the intelligence failure of the 1973 Yom Kippur War had faded like one of the chapters of Roman history.

On Oct 7, 1,500 Hamas militants breached the heavily fortified Gaza border and killed approximately 1,400 Israelis, primarily civilians. The causalities are four times the 9/11 attack on the US, in which 3000 people died, in the context of Israel’s population.

In Israel's retaliatory response, the Palestinian death toll has surged to 2,800, and the numbers continue to climb as Israel maintains an intense and destructive onslaught on the Gaza Strip. The conflict has escalated tensions on both sides, resulting in a harrowing display of bloodshed that has left the streets drenched in red.

Shashank Joshi, The Economist's Defense editor, emphasising the significance of this “breach”, pointed out that it was Israel's "conceptual" and "intellectual" failure to understand Hamas' deceptive strategies.

"The Israel of October 6th is no longer the same as it was on Oct 8th, just as the United States of September 11, 2001, stood in stark contrast to the nation on Sept 12th. They (Israelis) are willing to do anything which was previously considered off the table," remarked Shashank, emphasizing the magnitude of this pivotal moment.
 
In an interview with the YouTube channel “Uncensored”, Shashank said that even though the Gaza Strip is meticulously monitored and has long been deemed impregnable, this attack prompts questions about a highly rated Israeli surveillance network and a state-of-the-art border fence.

Intelligence Failure?

The Economist’s defence editor said this audacious breach, a departure from conventional expectations, bears eerie echoes of the pivotal 1973 Yom Kippur War and prompts profound questions about Israel's security infrastructure and intelligence apparatus, which is a historical strategic failure
 
“Soldiers and conscripts responsible for monitoring the surveillance cameras were ‘insufficiently attentive’. Conceptually and intellectually, there was a blind spot in understanding Hamas' intentions. The prevailing complacency was largely due to the perception that the principal threat lay elsewhere, with Israel's focus being directed toward Iran and the West Bank.

Internal Fissures

Israel is experiencing one of its most dramatic internal crises, where even the army is torn over the judicial overhaul plan advanced by the Netanyahu government. Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's opponents are of the view that reforms will severely undermine the country's democracy by weakening the judicial system.

The Economist’s defence editor says mass protests have left the country deeply divided and Hamas tried to take “advantage” as many of the Israeli military reservists had refused to serve and some were even distracted.

“This government is propped by right-wing parties who are pro-settlers, ethno-national-extremist. Netanyahu has virtually vertically split the nation. The government was expending energy to stay in power. Coupled with the fact that Hamas deceived it by sending signals that it was not interested in offensive measures. So the consequences were severe.”

Iran Angle

Iran, a major political force in the region, is close to Hamas and after the deadly Oct 7 attack, suspicions were raised about its involvement. The Wall Street Journal had on Oct 8 reported that Iran helped plan the attack.  A day later Iran rejected the accusations stating these were unfounded allegations based on political reasons.

Shashank also believes there is not enough evidence to suggest direct involvement of Iran, while it’s a fact that it’s close to Hamas.

“Iran has long-standing relations with Hamas. It arms, funds and trains its militants but there is no evidence to establish it was directly involved in this attack. Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and second largest group in Gaza, which is very close to Iran, was also taken by surprise corroborate this hypothesis.”

“Iran is close to Hezbollah. But, it remains to be seen if it wants Hezbollah to immediately step into conflict or wants it to preserve its military strength to provide a future deterrent in the event of its expansion .”

Tension between Israel and Hezbollah has also started to escalate. On Oct 17, Israel launched airstrikes against Hezbollah targets in southern Lebanon.  Hezbollah had said it shelled five Israeli positions near the border with Lebanon.

Derailing Abrahamic Accord?

About three years ago, on Sept 15, 2020, leaders across the Middle East signed the Abraham Accords to normalise diplomatic relations between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain under the auspices of the US.  

Three months later, Morocco also joined in the process. It was widely expected Saudi Arabia was also in the process of normalization relations with Israel but with certain guarantees.  

The Economist’s defence editor is sceptical of linking the attack to the “peace process” arguing that the “normalization” process between Saudi Arabia and Israel has been a long-term and steadily progressing endeavour.

“It's highly improbable that this attack was triggered by the peace process, as planning such a significant operation would have taken several months or even a year. The complexity of normalization as a broad and intricate diplomatic initiative should not be underestimated.”

Shashank, however, suggests that it’s worth noting that Hamas, which controls Gaza, has been co-opted and marginalised by Israel, itself hasn’t made Palestinians’ lives better. Fully knowing the implications of the attack, Hamas planned it to gain relevance and legitimacy.

Palestinian Authority (PA), led by 87-year-old Mahmoud Abbas, in control of the West Bank, is highly corrupt. There is discontent and a lack of trust among Palestinians against it. The rivalry between Hamas and Al Fatah, which controls PA and governs about 40% of the occupied West Bank, runs deep. In 2006, Al Fatah lost control of the Gaza Strip to Hamas.

“Hamas might have planned this attack to gain more legitimacy and more control of the region and edge out Al Fatah.”

Hamas’ Calculus

Since Oct 7 attack, 5,000 people including 1400 Israelis, have died. The conflict continues to escalate as on Oct 17, 500 people died in an attack at Gaza hospital. Palestinians alleged Israel carried out an air raid while Israel blamed a misfired rocket launched by Palestinian Islamic Jihad for it.

As causalities mount, pressure is mounting on Israel to declare a ceasefire. Shashank suggests Hamas' calculus might resemble that of al-Qaeda for the 9/11 attacks - inflicting harm on the enemy while garnering increased political support for their militant group.

“Hamas would have been well aware that Israel's response would differ from the two previous operations. Either, Israel could opt for a smaller-scale operation to avoid heavy costs to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), but this might allow Hamas to reconstitute, similar to previous attempts,” said Shashank.

He said another plausibility is Hamas could draw Israel into a prolonged campaign, potentially leading to a prolonged occupation of Gaza. It's important to recall that Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, and this move could increase hostilities and support for Hamas.

Israel’s Dilemma

In Shashank's assessment, Israel finds itself in a precarious position. The dilemma it faces involves the need to respond forcefully to appease public anger and demands while also treading cautiously to avoid opening up another front and potentially damaging relations with Arab states.

He acknowledges the difficulty in striking the right balance, and this situation calls for careful consideration.

Shashank draws an analogy to illustrate the complexity of the task at hand. He likens the idea of rooting out Hamas from Gaza to a hypothetical scenario where India would attempt to eliminate Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) from Pakistan's Punjab. While it may seem like a logical objective, the practicality, scale, and scope of such an undertaking could pose significant challenges and place a substantial strain on any armed force.